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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

BEVERLY KAY CHRISTENSEN,
Case No.

Plaintiff-Appellant,

16459

v.
ALFRED BRENT CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant-Respondent.
---0000000---

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff Beverly Kay Christensen (hereinafter
"Mrs. Christensen") commenced Civil Action Number 239969
(hereinafter "the civil action")

in the District Court

seeking relief from a decree of divorce previously entered
in Salt Lake County Domestic Relations Action Number D-20185
(hereinafter "the divorce case").

Consolidated with the

civil action for trial was Mrs. Christensen's Motion for
Modification in the divorce case.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following trial on February 14, 15, and 16, 1979,
Judge Baldwin signed, on April 16, 1979, a Judgment dismissing
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Mrs. Christensen's civil action(Civ. R. at 78-79), and~
Order in the divorce case denying Mrs. Christensen's motio~
for modification (Div. R. at 103-05).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Beverly Kay Christensen respectfully
requests that this Court reverse Judge Baldwin's denial of
Mrs. Christensen's Motion for Modification in the divorce
case and remand the case for further proceedings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties' sixteen and one-half year marriage
was dissolved by a decree of divorce entered by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., on December 19, 1975.
at 31-38.)

(Div. R.

That decree was based upon a stipulation reachec

between the parties

(Div. R. at 13-18).

It was Mrs. Christensen's contention in the civil
action that the stipulation upon which Judge Hanson's
decree had been based was the product of

misrepresentatw~

and fraud practiced upon her by Mr. Christensen.

Specific-

ally, Mrs. Christensen contended that Mr. Christensen
affirmatively misrepresented and concealed from her his true
financial condition and untruthfully and fraudulently
represented to her that certain substantial real property
holdings were,

in fact, worthless.

(Civ. R. at 9-13.)
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By

her Motion for Modification in the divorce case,
Mrs. Christensen contended that even if Mr. Christensen's
conduct complained of in the civil action did not rise to
the level of actionable fraud, she was, nevertheless,
entitled to a modification of the original decree based upon
the apparent change in circumstances manifest by a comparison of the resources of Mr. Christensen as assumed to
exist by the original Stipulation and Decree and those
resources of Mr. Christensen which actually existed at the
time.

(Div. R. at 90.)
The property which is the central issue in this

dispute is an apartment complex known as the Spring Hollow
Apartments located at 320 Gordon Lane, in Salt Lake County.
This 52-unit apartment complex was acquired and constructed
by the parties during the course of their marriage.

10.)

(Tr. at

During the negotiations between the parties leading to

the stipulation upon which the original Decree was based,
Mrs. Christensen was in the position of having to rely upon
Mr. Christensen's representations concerning the value and
extent of their property, since he had never kept her
apprised of their business affairs (Tr. at 3; 146; 202) and
she could not afford to retain an appraiser to establish
values of the property (Tr. at 25-26).
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Mrs. Christensen testified that Mr. Christense 11
represented to her that the apartment complex was without
any value since it had cost nearly twice as much to build as
anticipated, the mortgage obligation was at least equal to
its value at the time, and the rents were barely sufficient
to service the mortgage obligation.

(Tr. at 7.)

It is

undisputed that in December, 1975, when the Decree was
entered, the mortgage obligation owed on the apartment
complex was approximately $368,000.

(Tr. at 67.)

While

Mr. Christensen denied in his testimony that he stated
to Mrs. Christensen that the complex had no value, he
admitted that he told her that the gross value of the
apartment complex was only $460,000 (Tr. at 59), which
would indicate an equity of only $100,000.
While '1r. Christensen adrni tted telling his wife in
December that the apartment complex was worth only $460,000,
less than a month earlier he had certified in a financial
statement that the apartment complex had a fair market value
of $710,000.

(Exhibits 8-P and 9-P.)

Thus, less than a

month before he told his wife either (her testimony) that
the apartment complex was worthless or (his testimony) that
it had a net equity of $100,000, he had admitted in a
.
ket value
financial statement that the complex had a f air mar
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of almost three-quarters of a million dollars, which would
indicate a net equity of $342,000--three and a half times
what he told his wife it was worth, even under his version
of the facts.

Moreover, within five months after Mr. Chris-

tensen admittedly represented to his wife that the complex
was worth, at most, $460,000, he listed the property for
sale at $950,000

(Tr. at 188), and rejected an offer to

purchase the property for $900,000 with a $150,000 cash down
payment (Tr. at 71; Exhibit 23-D).
It was the uncontradicted opinion of Mrs. Christensen's expert witnesses that the apartment complex was
actually worth between $750,000 and $825,000 in December,
1975.

(Tr. at 109-10.)
Upon learning of the discrepency between the

actual values of the property and those values attributed to
the property by Mr. Christensen, Mrs. Christensen attempted
to modify the original decree through an Order to Show Cause
filed on August 12, 1976.

On November 18, 1976, however,

the Honorable Dean E. Conder ruled that since Mrs. Christensen
sought to modify the original decree on the basis of fraud
discovered more than three months after its entry, her only
recourse was through an independent fraud action.
at 60.)

(Div. R.

Thereafter, Mrs. Christensen filed the civil action
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presently before this Court, which was later consolidated
with her motion for modification filed in the original
divorce case (Div. R. at 90).
Prior to trial, Mrs. Christensen's attorney
entered into an agreement with Walter R. Ellett, the
attorney representing Mr. Christensen, to the effect that
Mr. Christensen and his accountant would produce in court

all «books and records and check records sufficient to
demonstrate [Mr. Christensen's]
year 1978.

(Exhibit 24-P.)

income production"

fortne

Notwithstanding the failure of

both Mr. Christensen and his accountant to produce a single
record relating in any manner to the year 197 8 (Tr. at 1511,
Mr. Christensen was permitted to testify in conclusory

a~

summary fashion as to his speculations and conjectures as to
his income and expenses for that year (Tr. at 222-25).

fu.

Christensen admitted that while these records existed, he
had not bothered to bring them with him.

(Tr. at 234-35.)

Judge Baldwin was unable to see the "materiality" of either
the agreement reached or the defendant's blatant disregard
of it (Tr. at 234), and summarily rejected the proffer made
by Mrs. Christensen's counsel (Tr. at 244-45).

As a result,

no meaningful evidence was adduced as to Mr. Christensen' 5

1978 income, expenses, or property holdings.
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l

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT A

MODIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL DECREE.
It appears without question from the record that
Mr. Christensen represented to his wife that the apartment
complex was worth at most $460,000, although only one month
earlier he had certified that it was worth at least $710,000
and five months later he listed the property for sale at
$950,000 and rejected an offer to purchase the property for
$900,000 with a $150,000 cash down payment.

The uncontra-

dicted record also indicates that the property actually had
a value of $750,000 to $825,000 in December, 1975.

Even if

the trial court was justified under these circumstances in
finding that Mr. Christensen's conduct was not fraudulent,
the court was not justified in its denial of Mrs. Christensen's motion for modification of the original property
distribution.
If, as the trial court apparently believed, the
assumption by Mrs. Christensen, her former attorney, and the
original divorce court that the property had an equity of at
most $100,000 was the result of non-fraudulent, innocent
errors or misapprehensions on the part of Mr. Christensen,
it was nevertheless clear that the stipulation between Mr.
and Mrs. Christensen was grossly inaccurate and had been

-7-
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relied upon by the original divorce court in distributing
their property.

When a comparison is drawn between the

value of the apartment complex as assumed by the original
divorce court (an equity of at most $100,000) and the actual
value of the property at that time (an equity of between
$400,000 and $500,000), a discrepancy in excess of one
quarter million dollars is revealed.
Due to this discrepancy, there is an apparent (ii
not an actual)

increase in Mr. Christensen's financial

resources when a comparison is drawn between Mr. Christensen' s resources as assumed to exist by the original divorce
court and his actual resources.

The trial court should have

granted Mrs. Christensen's motion for a modification of the
original decree based upon this apparent increase.
This Court has recognized and endorsed such a
procedure.

For example, in Kess inakis v. Kessinakis, 546

P.2 888 (Utah 1976), the factual situation was analytically
identical with that present in these cases.

The wife, u

plaintiff, had been granted an uncontested divorce.

Alleg-

ing that the decree had been based upon misrepresentations
made by his wife as to the extent of his economic resources,

·
the husband moved the trial court to set aside
or mo a·1 f Y the
decree.

As in this case, the motion was made more than 90

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

days following the entry of the original decree.

While this

court held that the decree could not be set aside on the
basis of the alleged misrepresentations, it was careful to
demonstrate that the party aggrieved by the misrepresentations
to the trial court was not without a means of obtaining
relief, noting that the victim of the alleged misrepresentations was
not helpless.
He may petition the
trial court for modification of the
terms of the decree, if there is a
change of circumstances. While his
actual earnings may now be the same
as they were at the time of the
divorce proceeding, neither party
can at this late day, dispute the
findings made by the court at the
hearing.
If [the husband's] earnings and wealth are now less than
what the court found them to be,
there is a change of circumstances
which would justify a consideration
by the court of the need to modify
the original decree.
546 P.2d at 889

(emphasis added).

Mr. Christensen as well as

~s.

Likewise in this case,

Christensen is bound by

the representations made to and the assumptions drawn
by the original divorce court as to the marital assets
of the parties.

comparison of the total amount of these

assets as assumed to exist by the original divorce court
with the actual amount of those assets as proved in the
recent proceedings before the trial court, demonstrates
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that the actual value of the assets far exceeded the value
assumed by both Mrs. Christensen and the original divorce
court.
Under the principles enunciated by this court in
Kessinakis, the distribution of the original decree should
be modified in recognition of the greater value clearly
proven at the recent hearing.

Such a modification is

necessary both to provide Mrs. Christensen with a reasonable
and equitable share of the marital assets and to prevent /1r.
Christensen from unjustly profiting from his highly

quest~~

able conduct.
Al though modi f ica ti on of a divorce decree based
upon a change in circumstances more frequently relates to
the alimony or child support, it is clear under the statutes
of this state, and the decisions of this Court interpreting
those statutes, that similar modification of the property
distribution is appropriate.

Section 30-3-5, Utah Code

Annotated (1953 as amended), expressly states, in pertinent
part, that:
The court shall have continuing
jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new orders
with respect to
. the distribution of property as shall
be reasonable and necessary.
Interpreting this statute, this Court has held:
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[U)nder our statutes, the court
retains jurisdiction of the parties
to modify the decree with respect
to the distribution of property.
Bott v. Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329, 437 P.2d 684 at 685 (1968)
(citations omitted).
In Larsen v. Daynes, 102 Utah 312, 133 P.2d 785
(1943) , this Court expressly relied upon Section 30-3-5 in
granting a subsequent modification of a property distribution.
For almost 100 years, since its decision in
Whitmore v. Harden, 3 Utah 121, 1 Pac. 465 (1882), this
Court has recognized the propriety of subsequent modification as to the property distribution as well as to the
alimony and child support provisions of divorce decrees.
Accordingly, even if the trial court was justified
in finding that

~r.

Christensen's conduct did not constitute

fraud, the trial court was clearly not justified in denying
modification of the original decree.

Even if the value of

Mr. Christensen's property holdings has not increased since
the entry of the original decree, there appears to have been
an increase in the value of those holdings when the value
which Mr. Christensen admits he placed upon those holdings-which value must have been relied upon not only by Mrs.
Christensen but also by the original divorce court--is
compared with the true and actual value of the Christensens'
property.
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Under this Court's holding in Kessinakis, such an apparent
change in circumstances was sufficient grounds for modification of the original property distribution.

The trial

court's refusal to grant such a modification constitutes
clear error and should be reversed.

II.

IN VIEW OF MR. CHRISTENSEN'S WILLFUL FAILURE

TO PRODUCE HIS FINANCIAL RECORDS AS AGREED, THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN PERMITTING HIS SELF-SERVING TESTIMONY AS TO HIS
1978 INCOME AND EXPENSES.
Mr. Christensen, through his counsel Walter R.
Ellett, agreed that he would produce in court at the trial
all of his "books and records and check records sufficient
to demonstrate [his]

income production" for 1978, without

the necessity of Subpoenas Duces Tecum being served upon h1rn
and his accountant.

While Mr. Christensen admitted the

existence of these documents (Tr. at 234-35), he willful~
failed to produce them in court.

Notwithstanding Mr. Chris·

tensen's failure to produce these key documents, the u~l
court permitted him to testify to his conclusions and
conjectures as to his 1978 income and expenses, over Mrs.
Christensen's repeated objections.

(Tr. at 222; 223; 22 4.I

Moreover, the trial court denied Mrs. Christensen's motion

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to strike this self-serving and unsupported testimony.

(Tr.

at 235.)
As a result of Mr. Christensen's willful failure
to produce his records, the trial court's ruling, and Mrs.
Christensen's reliance upon the good faith of attorney
Ellett, she was effectively precluded from all opportunity
of establishing the significant changes in Mr. Christensen's
financial circumstances upon which a modification of the
alimony provisions of the original decree might have been
based.

It is, therefore, appropriate that this Court remand

this case to the trial court so as to permit Mrs. Christensen a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate Mr. Christensen's
increased financial capabilities.
As this court noted in Stevens v. Gray, 123 Utah
395, 259 P.2d 889 (1953), it is only under extremely unusual
circumstances, explained to the trial court's complete
satisfaction, that a party should be permitted to testify as
to matters contained within records which have not themselves been produced.

In that case, which was an action

between two partners for an accounting, one of the partners
claimed various credits and offsets for feed and wages
allegedly expended on behalf of the partnership's affairs;
however, he failed to produce at trial any of the records
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supporting his claims, merely testifying, i n a se lf -serving
fashion as did Mr. Christensen, as to the amounts which he
claimed were due and owing to him.

This Court noted that

where
records should have been kept, and
are not produced, the court should
look with extreme caution upon
such secondary evidence [as the
party's own unsupported testimony].
259 P.2d at 891.

This Court then held that the party's

unsubstantiated testimony was so unconvincing that it was
error for the trial court to have relied upon it; accordingly, the trial court's finding based upon the party's
unsupported testimony was reversed.
In this case, due to Mr. Christensen's willful
disregard of the agreement that his attorney had assured
Mrs. Christensen's counsel would be honored, there was no
evidence, aside from Mr. Christensen's own unsupported,
self-serving testimony, relating to his 1978 income and
expenses.

Without such testimony, it was impossible for the

trial court to render any meaningful determination as to
whether or not a change had occurred in Mr. Christensen's
income capabilities.

Absent such a determination,. the trial

court's denial of Mrs. Christensen's motion for modification
cannot be supported.

The case should, therefore, be remandea
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to the trial court so as to permit Mrs. Christensen a
reasonable opportunity to produce evidence of Mr. Christensen's increased financial capabilities.

CONCLUSION
Even assuming the trial court to have been justified
in determining that Mr. Christensen's representations
concerning the value of the parties' apartment complex were
not fraudulent,

it was error for the trial court to refuse

to order a modification of the original decree, which was
based upon conceded representations by Mr. Christensen that
the apartment complex was worth at least a quarter million
dollars less than its actual value.

This Court has consist-

ently construed the statues of this state to permit modification of the property distribution.

Moreover, this Court

has held that where the original decree is based upon an
assumption of the trial court which is later demonstrated to
have been erroneous, there is an apparent (even if not an
actual) change in circumstance.

This apparent change in

circumstance has been held to be sufficient to require
modification of the original property distribution.

In this

case, the record makes clear that, even under the version of
the facts recited by Mr. Christensen, he under-valued the
parties' apartment complex by at least $250,000.

Accordingly,
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there is an apparent increase of some $250,000 when the
value of the apartment complex as assumed by the trial
court and the Christensens at the time the original
decree is compared with the actual value of the apartment
complex.

The trial court's refusal to order a modification

of the property distribution based upon this apparent
change in circumstances was clearly erroneous.
Additionally, Mrs. Christensen's efforts to
demonstrate that Mr. Christensen's income had increased
significantly since the original decree were thwarted
by Mr. Christensen's willful failure to carry through
with the agreement reached between his counsel and
Mrs. Christensen's.

The trial court erred in permitting

Mr. Christensen's self-serving and conclusory testimony
as to his 1978 income and expenses in light of the fact
that he had willfully failed to abide by the agreement
reached with Mrs. Christensen's counsel.

As a result of

Mr. Christensen's conduct and the errors of the trial
court, Mrs. Christensen has been deprived of any reasonable opportunity to establish on the record Mr. Christensen's significant increase in annual income since the
original decree.

Accordingly, this case should be

remanded to the trial court so as to permit Mrs. Christensen
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a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate Mr. Christensen's
increased income.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of November,
1979.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the
foregoing Brief to Walter R. Ellett, 5085 South State, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84107, this 23rd day of November, 1979.
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